Ronald Reagan popularized the somewhat nonsensical phrase "Trust But Verify," for describing the US position on Cold War arms reductions. The US and the Soviet Union both usually went into negotiations hoping to cut nuclear stockpiles, but neither felt certain that the other would make the agreed-upon reductions. Opening up to inspectors from the other side meant national security might be compromised. Yet neither wanted to just trust the other to make stockpile cuts.
A similar impasse has arisen at the Copenhagen climate talks this week over the reductions of national carbon outputs...
Adapted from "Arms control deja vu in climate talks" from my site.
NYT:
China, which last month for the first time publicly announced a target for reducing the rate of growth of its greenhouse gas emissions, is refusing to accept any kind of international monitoring of its emissions levels, according to negotiators and observers here. The United States is insisting that without stringent verification of China’s actions, it cannot support any deal.
...they will not accept any outside monitors to ensure that they are indeed making the changes that they have promised to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide and other pollutants emitted per unit of economic output.
[...]
He Yafei, the Chinese vice foreign minister, said China’s laws would guarantee compliance. "This is a matter of principle," even if it scuttles the talks, he said in an interview with The Financial Times.
From that FT article:
Rich countries, particularly the US, want China and other poor countries to agree to make their commitments on emissions binding internationally and "measurable, reportable and verifiable", which would enable them to ensure that the necessary measures to cut emissions were taking place.
"We don’t need developing countries to guarantee the outcome of their measures [to cut emissions], but we need the measures to be [verifiable]," one developed country official said.
So, it's a stalemate. I wonder if negotiators will make that connection to the warhead reduction verification problem and try to find inspiration from the solutions in bilateral arms treaty talks.
But, really, Mr. Vice Foreign Minister? Really? Chinese law will guarantee something? Of course everyone wants to verify. The Chinese regulation system as it currently stands is not exactly a paragon for the rest of the world. If it were, we wouldn't have had story after story about contaminated milk and toothpaste and toxic children's toys.
Carbon emissions cuts aren't a matter of protecting national security in the way that arms reductions are, so it's harder for avoiding verification to be anything but a way to avoid cutting emissions. So, why bother making the legally binding commitment to cut if you won't let anyone check that you're following the law?
Unfortunately, this is one of the more important elements of the treaty negotiations. The reductions promised here will mean very little if they aren't implemented (See: Kyoto Protocol, Industrialized Nations). The best way to do that is to make it possible for countries to verify everyone else's carbon reductions. Pledges need to be "measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV)" (the official phrasing). Obviously, the reductions negotiations and the debate on aiming for a rise of 1.5˚C or 2˚C are making the most headlines, but I would argue that the MRV component is more important because that is what gives meaning and importance to the carbon reductions themselves.
Therein lies the problem. As with arms control talks, it becomes harder and harder to trust the other negotiators when they are rebuffing any attempt to agree on a verification system for reductions. In fact, everything could hinge on whether or not all these countries can agree to meaningful verification. There's little incentive to keep working on the reductions if you know they won't mean anything, and when a major player like China won't budge on verification, then it seems fairly obvious (as above) that that player has little intention of following through on reductions.
In the Cold War, American and Soviet leaders didn't want warhead reductions to be a weakness or vulnerability, which meant each side wanted to ensure that the other side was meeting their reduction promises. In the climate talks, with leaders in the US and in developing nations worrying that carbon reductions commitments will cause economic harm, verification is the only way to ensure that no country is getting an economic edge by cheating on their pledged carbon reductions. In fact, nine Senate Democrats have signed a letter to President Obama stating that they will not support climate legislation unless the international agreement contains verification and enforcement. That the economic disadvantage fear is the wrong mindset at all for those involved is for another diary, but that's how most negotiators are approaching the issue, so that's why it's crucial to get an MRV agreement in the treaty.
China had been making very encouraging moves in recent months (and years), but if they don't agree to verification, it starts to look as though their previous efforts were more posturing than commitment. That will be unfortunate in and of itself, but refusal to give way on verification could sink the negotiations entirely.
Of course, this isn't something limited to China, but China is one of the most important players. As with warhead reduction negotiations, it only works if all players agree to verification. So, it will be important to get all countries on board. For the moment, however, China has created this impasse, and they will need to remove it to get the talks moving in the right direction again. They may reverse their position under threat of trade sanctions, which have been discussed as a response.
For political or diplomatic reasons, we can say we trust countries to reduce their carbon emissions, but in reality this will only work if we can measure, report, and verify reductions.
You can also read more about the MRV controversy at Copenhagen from ClimateProgress.